This morning Vice President Kamala Harris chose Minnesota Governor Tim Walz as her running mate, soon to be ratified by the delegates at the national convention. How should we think about her selection process?
A little history
Presidential candidates didn’t always control their VP selections, partly because presidential nominations were often very much in doubt and were won only after horse trading at or just before the convention. But beginning in the 1960s it became common for the presumptive presidential nominee to present his or her VP selection as a fait accompli to the convention delegates.
So what goes into the selection process? It’s difficult to generalize given the idiosyncrasies each presidential candidate brings to the table. But there are some patterns.
Covering your bases
Most presidential candidates look at the VP selection as a way to address their weaknesses. Massachusetts liberals like JFK and Michael Dukakis believed they needed help with Texas and other southern states. They selected Lyndon Johnson and Lloyd Bentsen respectively, both Texas senators at the time. Geographical diversity was also featured in the selections made by Barry Goldwater in ‘64, Lyndon Johnson in ‘68, Jimmy Carter in ‘76, and John Kerry in 2004.
Just as common are efforts to address philosophical differences within the party. In 2016 Donald Trump believed he needed help with evangelicals and went with Mike Pence. Richard Nixon’s 1968 choice, Spiro Agnew, was an effort to appeal to blue collar voters. Bob Dole went with supply-sider Jack Kemp in ‘96 given the suspicions the right wing had about him. John McCain’s selection of Sarah Palin in 2008 was also designed to shore up the right wing.
Some VP picks suggest other perceived weaknesses on the part of the presidential candidate. George W. Bush was thought callow by some; his selection of Dick Cheney in 2000, a former Secretary of Defense, House Minority Whip, and White House Chief of Staff, was thought to bring gravitas to the ticket. Similarly, Barack Obama’s inexperience in high level public office may have influenced his choice of long-time Senator Joe Biden.
Ronald Reagan’s 1980 VP selection process revealed two perceived weaknesses of his candidacy. Despite his two terms as governor of California, he was widely regarded as a rigid ideologue without foreign policy chops. In an effort to reassure moderate Republicans and swing voters, he made a big play in the early stages of the convention to convince former President Gerald Ford to run with him. Ford’s demands for a co-presidency were deemed excessive, so Reagan went with another safe establishment pick, George HW Bush.
The Hail Mary Pass
A couple of presidential candidates have gone for the long bomb. Mondale’s 1984 presidential effort was thought by many to be doomed given the strong economy and Reagan’s popularity. His selection of Congresswoman Geraldine Ferraro, the first woman on a major party ticket, was an effort to shake up the race.
Reagan was in contention for the 1976 Republican nomination leading up to the convention, with President Gerald Ford considered the favorite. Reagan made a desperation move: he picked a liberal Republican Senator, Richard Schweiker, in an effort to appeal to a specific delegation and a few other uncommitted delegates. It didn’t work.
Selections made from a position of strength
Presidential candidates who are confident they are heading into the fall from a position of strength make picks that enhance their narrative. In 1988 then VP GHW Bush saw himself as uniquely qualified for the presidency. He looked to enhance his message with a youthful spin on establishment conservatism in the person of Dan Quayle.
Hillary Clinton’s 2016 selection of Tim Kaine is also best thought of as a “position of strength” choice. Democrats believed Republicans had blundered badly in nominating Donald Trump and that victory was in their grasp. The idea was simply to reinforce the moderately liberal, experienced Clinton narrative with a safe, respectable choice.
This year, Trump was riding high after President Biden’s dismal debate performance. He eschewed candidates with specific electoral upsides (e.g., Marco Rubio’s potential appeal to wavering Latino voters) to go with 39 year old JD Vance, who represents an effort to enhance the right wing populist message.
Perhaps the most striking choice-from-strength was Bill Clinton’s selection of a southern moderate for his running mate in 1992. (Yes, Al Gore was considered a moderate in those days.) The idea was that he and Gore would show a New Democrat centrist approach as a turn away from the New Deal liberalism of the last couple of generations. While Clinton had been counseled by some to make a ticket balancing pick, instead he underlined the change he represented for the party.
Where does the Walz selection fit in?
Many observers assumed Vice President Harris would go with the cover-your-bases approach by selecting a relatively moderate white male from a swing state. While pigeon-holing Harris ideologically is tricky — she was once attacked by progressives for being too inclined to incarcerate criminals — she is being portrayed by Republicans as part of the far left. Hence arguably a safe solution: go with Josh Shapiro (PA), Mark Kelly (AZ), or Roy Cooper (NC).
Instead she chose to reinforce her progressive base and message with the selection of Walz. Is this an indication of operating from a position of strength (Walz is not from a swing state)? Or did she kowtow to the left?
My take is that Harris seems to be intent on projecting strength in the selection of Walz. And maybe that’s the right approach — one analyst told me this morning that projecting strength can take on a life of its own.
But is she overconfident in her prospects? Should she instead have addressed perceived weaknesses? Certainly if she loses Pennsylvania and the presidency (which likely follow one from the other) there will be a lot of I-told-you-so’s out there.
Great point, John. I wonder if Walz fills Harris’ gap to the upper Midwest as she is a coastal elite. Thoughts?